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Abstract 
Based on the structural VAR model of the global crude oil market proposed by Kilian(2009), this article investigates 
the causes for wild fluctuations in oil prices since the mid-2000s. A main contribution of the study is to compare the 
effects of changes in oil price on three major economies, the US, the UK, and Japan. I find oil-specific demand shocks 
as well as aggregate demand shocks played an important role in the rise in the real price of oil since early 2002 and the 
subsequent sharp drops after the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.. Moreover I have found that oil-specific 
demand shocks increase real GDP in Japan, which is very different from the US and the UK where oil-specific 
demand shocks lead to reduction in real GDP. This difference possibly comes from the oil efficiency of Japanese 
products.
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1. Introduction 
This  paper  investigates  the  causes  for  wild  fluctuations  in  oil  prices  since  the 
mid-2000s. It also assesses, empirically, the effects of oil price shocks on the real economic 
activity and price development of three industrialized countries; the US, the UK, and Japan. 
In order to pursue my study, I have used the structural VAR model of the global crude oil 
market proposed by Kilian (2009).   
The price of oil is one of the most familiar economic indicators for many people as it is 
closely related to daily  life. W e  are sensitive to changes in the price of gasoline or that of gas 
for example. Therefore, changes in the price of oil and their causes have been an interesting 
issue for economists. Early works reported that recessions in the US economy were related to 
exogenous political events in OPEC countries and subsequent rises in the price of oil. For 
example, Hamilton (1983, 1996) and Hooker (1996) show that most of the US recessions 
were preceded by increases in oil price
1. The effect of the oil shock on the US economy has 
been studied by many economists from other aspects as well. For instance, Bernanke, Gertler, 
and  Watson  (1997)  studied  oil  price  shocks  in  terms  of  monetary  policy.  Finn  (2000) 
investigated the role of exogenous oil price variation as a source of the US economic cycle. 
However, the writers of early literatures generally assumed exogeneity of oil shocks in 
studying the response of macroeconomic aggregates, when there may be reverse causality 
from  the  global  economy  through  oil  demand  prices.  This  may  bring  inappropriate 
implications  to  policy  makers.  For  example,  a  central  bank  would  unambiguously  raise 
interest rates in response to an endogenous demand-driven increase in the price of oil, but 
may  face a difficult tradeoff between inflation and output when deciding policy against an 
exogenous cost-push, oil supply-shock. This point is closely related to the ongoing debate 
over whether it was oil supply shocks or contractionary monetary policy that caused the US 
recession in the late 1970s and 1980s, e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), Barsky and 
Kilian (2002, 2004)
2, and Hamilton and Herrera (2004). Developing the works of Barsky and 
Kilian (2002, 2004), Kilian (2009) established the structural VAR model of the global oil 
market in order to identify three underlying shocks in the global oil market: (1) oil supply 
shocks; shocks to the physical ability to produce oil, (2) aggregate demand shocks; shocks to 
the  current  demand  for  all  industrial  commodities  which  are  determined  by  global 
macroeconomic  conditions  and  (3)  oil-specific  demand  shocks;  shocks  which  cannot  be 
explained  based  on  oil  supply  shocks  or  aggregate  demand  shocks.  Oil-specific  demand 
shocks may for example, reflect precautionary demand
3, which stems from an uncertainty 
                                                   
1  Hamilton (1996) use “net oil price increase” as an oil price variables while Hooker (1996b), in his reply 
to Hamilton (1996), casts doubt on the theoretical and empirical validity of using “net oil price increase” to 
represent oil price shocks to the macro economy. 
2  Barsky and Kilian (2004) reports five recessions of the US which followed surges in the price of oil: the 
recessions of November 1973, January 1980, July 1981, July 1990 and March 2001. 
3  Alquist and Kilian (2007) conduct formal analysis on precautionary shocks. It is stated that 
precautionary demand varies depending on whether there is good access to inventory holdings of oil that 2 
 
about possible future shortfalls of oil. Based on this identification of structural shocks, Kilian 
concludes that a rise in oil price may affect the real economy differently, depending on the 
underlying cause of the increase in the real price of oil. Today, it is widely understood that 
the price of oil has been endogenous to global macroeconomic conditions and cannot be 
treated as exogenous. 
As seen in the previous studies above, most literatures have mainly focused on the 
effects of changes in oil price on the US economy. In contrast, a relatively small number of 
studies have been done for other major economies, such as Japan. Much remains unknown 
about the response of those economies associated with oil price fluctuations. To the best of 
my knowledge, this article is the first study to make a comparison of the effects of changes in 
oil price on three major economies, the US, the UK, and Japan, taking the endogeneit y   of oil 
price into consideration. The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, the historical 
decomposition analysis allows me to conclude that oil-specific demand shocks as well  as 
aggregate demand shocks played an important role in the rise in the real price of oil since 
early 2002 and the subsequent sharp drops after the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.. 
Second, Kilian’s finding, the way oil price changes affect economy is different depending on 
where the changes fundamentally come from, is found not to be specific to US economy. It is 
also true for two other big industrialized economies; Japan and the UK. Third, I have found 
that oil-specific demand shocks increase real GDP in Japan, which is very different from the 
US  and  the  UK  where  oil-specific  demand  shocks  lead  to  reduction  in  real  GDP.  This 
difference possibly comes from the oil efficiency of Japanese products. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed 
description  of  the  data.  Section  3  describes  the  econometric  models  used  in  this  paper. 
Section 4 summarizes the empirical results, such as historical decomposition and measures 
the impact of the shocks on three economies by regressing three structural shocks on the 
growth of real GDP and CPI. Section 5 proposes a conclusion. 
 
2. Data Description 
Following  Kilian  (2009),  I  will  consider  the  following  three  shocks  as  structural 
innovations  to  the  global  oil  market;  oil  supply  shocks,  aggregate  demand  shocks  and 
oil-specific demand shocks. Correspondingly, the variables which I will use are as follows: 
world crude oil production; world industrial production
4; and West Texas Intermediate spot 
crude oil prices
5. Details about the data such as its sources are described in the Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                                              
may act like an insurance against a disturbance in oil supplies. 
4  The index of world industrial production is weighted sum of the industrial production of each OECD 
countries plus major six non-member economies; Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, 
and South Africa. The weight is calculated based on purchasing-power-parity valuation of each country.   
5  As for the oil price, the US refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil deflated by the US CPI is used 
in Kilian (2009). Instead of this series, I use WTI because besides the fact that WTI is considered one of 
the most popular international oil price index.   3 
 
Table 1      Data description and sources 
Variable  Description  Data source 
World Production of Oil (prod)  Original Series.  Oil and Gas Journal 
World  Industrial  Production 
(IIP) 
Seasonally adjusted. 
Gap from linear trend. 
Organisation  for  Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
Real oil price (p)  Original  Series  of  WTI 
deflated by the US CPI. 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Japanese Real GDP    Seasonally adjusted.  Cabinet Office of Japan 
The US Real GDP  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
The UK Real GDP  Office for National Statistics 
Japanese CPI  Organisation  for  Economic 
Co-operation and Development  The UK CPI 
The US CPI 
 
The major differences described by Kilian (2009) are a choice of variable which 
represents global real economic activity and the length of the sample period. For the index of 
global real economic activity, Kilian (2009) constructs his original series based on dry cargo 
freight rates. To some extent, the fluctuations in freight rates captures the cycle of 
macroeconomic conditions. However, it possibly reflects some irrelevant information to real 
economic activity which is specific to the ship-freight market, such as weather condition and 
a demurrage. Therefore, I will use the index of world industrial production instead, taking the 
difference from its time trend to capture the development of global real economic activity 
well. As for the sample period, this paper covers 1973.1-2010.12 which is the updated series 
of Kilian (2009), 1973.1-2006.10. This allows me to reveal the underlying cause of the hike 
in oil price in summer 2008 and the subsequent sharp drop. 
 
3. Methodology 
          Similar  to  Kilian  (2009),  I  will  take  the  following  two  steps  in  my  analytical 
framework. A s   a   f i r s t   s t e p , the structural VAR model of the global crude oil market will be 
estimated in order to obtain a series of identified shocks. Secondly, by using these structural 
shocks obtained from the S V A R  model, regression models will be estimated to assess the 
macroeconomic implication of the identified shocks for each country. 
3.1 The Structural VAR model: Decomposing the Real Price of Oil 
Consider a restricted VAR model with 24 lags
6  based on monthly data described in the 
                                                   
6  Although the lag length indicated by AIC is 7, based on the fact that I use monthly series in model, I 
have decided to take 24 lags as Kilian (2009) does. We can avoid the problem of dynamic 
misspecification by taking 24 lags. The results based on 7 lags and 12 lags are very similar to the result 
based on 24 lags. 4 
 
previous section. The restricted VAR is represented as 
t i t
i




β α   (1) 




P)’.  ∆prodt is the percentage change in 
global crude oil production and all variables are expressed in the natural log
7. 
Then, the structural VAR is represented as   
t i t
i




0 0 β α   (2) 
In order to identify the structural shocks ut, it is assumed that A0
-1 takes a specific form 
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The  assumptions  on  A0
-1  are  motivated  as  follows:  First,  oil  supply  shocks  are 
innovations to oil production that are assumed not to respond to innovations to the demand 
for oil within the same month. i.e., the model postulates a vertical short-run supply curve of 
crude oil. Second, aggregate demand shocks are innovations to world industrial production 
that oil supply shocks cannot explain. With aggregate demand shocks, it is assumed that a rise 
in oil price, driven by shocks which are specific to the oil market, will not lower global world 
industrial production with a delay of at least a month. Lastly oil-specific demand shocks are 
innovations to the oil price that can be accounted for by neither the oil supply shocks nor 
aggregate demand shocks. Oil-specific demand shocks are, for example, supposed to reflect 
changes  in  precautionary  demand,  which  come  from  uncertainty  about  future  oil  supply 
shortage. They are also supposed to reflect changes caused by speculative demand for oil. 
3.2. Regression Model 
Next I will explain how the structural innovations in model (3) affect the CPI and real 
GDP growth in the US, the UK, and Japan. One complication that must be addressed is 
caused by the fact that real GDP is not available at monthly frequency. In addition, the series 
other  than  real  GDP  which  are  given  at  a  monthly  frequency cannot  be  aggregated  to  a 
quarterly frequency because at that frequency, the identifying assumptions used in estimating 
model  (3)  would  no  longer  be  credible
8.  In  order  to  deal  with  the  frequency  not  being 
consistent, I firstly average the monthly structural innovation for each quarter: 
                                                   
7  The first difference of world production of oil, the level of index of economic activity and the level of 
real price of oil are used in Kilian (2009)’s original model. Stability test for the estimated VAR is also 
conducted. 
8  The use of IIP for Japan is a possible clue to deal with the frequency problem because IIP is monthly 
data which is compatible with the short-run restrictions on my structural VAR models. However, I would 
rather see an effect of changes in oil price on whole economy which includes nonmanufacturing 
industries instead than manufacturing industries only. Thus quarterly real GDP data is used instead. 5 
 









i t j jt ζ   (4) 
where  u ��,�,�  refers to the estimated residual for the jth structural shock in the ith month of the 
tth quarter of the sample. Then by regressing the first difference of real GDP and the CPI on 
the averaged structural innovations with lags of innovations and constant respectively, I make 
it possible to investigate the impact of the shocks on each economy
9:   
, 3 , 2 , 1 , ˆ
12
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= + + = ∆ −
= ∑ j r y jt i jt
i
ji j t ζ φ α   (5) 
, 3 , 2 , 1 , ˆ
12
0
= + + = −
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ji j t ζ ψ β π
 
(6) 
where    ∆y �  and  π�  refers  to  the  first  difference  of  real  GDP  and  that  of  the  CPI 
respectively  and  r ��  and  v��  are  errors
10.  In  this  regression  model,  becauseφandψ  are 
interpreted as an impulse response coefficients at horizon h, the number of lags is determined 
by the maximum horizon of the impulse response function, which is set to 12 quarters. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Although I used different data for all three variables in the SVAR from those used by 
Kilian (2009), the results
11  of the estimation are similar to his. Figure 1 plots the historical 
evolution (expressed as annual averages for readability) of the structural shocks obtained 
from the model. As shown by Kilian (2009), there was no evidence of unanticipated global 
oil supply disruptions in 1978 or 1979 but there were large negative shocks to crude oil 
supply  in  1980  and  1981,  associated  with  the  outbreak  of  the  Iran–Iraq  War.  As  for 
oil-specific demand shocks, there was also a large positive shock in 1979. This is consistent 
with the fact that there was growing uncertainty about future oil supply at that time because 
of successive political events such as the Iranian Revolution, the Iranian hostage crisis and 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Looking at the movements in the period from 2007 to the present, which is out of 
Kilian’s sample period, there is a huge negative shock to aggregate demand in 2008. It  clearly 
reflects the worldwide economic depression that started with the failure of Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. on 15 September 2008. Another interesting point is that there is also a large 
negative  disturbance  to  oil-specific  demand.  This  is  consistent  with  the  view  of  market 
                                                   
9  Note that regressions (5) and (6) rely on the assumption that within a given quarter there is no feedback 
from  ∆y �  and  π�  to ζˆ i.e., these shocks can be treated as predetermined with respect to the growth of 
real GDP and the CPI. 
10  Those errors are potentially serially correlated. For right inference on the response estimates obtained 
by model (5) and (6), serial correlation problem is dealt with by using block bootstrap methods. 
Following Kilian(2008), block size 4 and 20,000 bootstrap replications are used. 




watchers that there was large outflow of speculative funds from the oil market which had 
increased  the  oil  price  more  than  fundamentally  determined.  The  disturbance  to  the 
oil-specific demand can also be interpreted, if it is understood that with the sharp drop in 
demand for oil, the expectations of investors for future oil demand also decreased. 
 
4.1. Historical Decomposition of the Price of Oil 
Figure 2 plots a historical decomposition of the real price of oil into the contribution of 
the structural shocks. The cumulative effects of each structural shock on the real price of 
crude oil are indicated by the solid line in each panel. This historical decomposition obtained 
from my model is consistent with the findings of Kilian (2009) in that oil supply shocks made 
a small contribution to oil price movements, and that shocks due to aggregate demand and 
oil-specific shocks made far bigger contributions to the real price of oil. 
By taking a closer look at the recent developments to the cumulative effect of demand 
shock, we can see that the recent increase was driven largely by aggregate demand shocks. A 
large part of the surge in the real price of oil from the end of 2006 to the middle of 2008 in 
particular can be explained by this. It is also obvious that the level of the cumulative effect of 
aggregate demand shock on real price of oil in 2010 has recovered close to pre-Lefman shock 
level and it has helped maintain oil price at a historically high level. Meanwhile, oil-specific 
demand  shocks  played  an  important  role  in  the  recent  surge  as  well.  It  is  obvious  that 
oil-specific demand shocks also contributed largely to the surge in oil price in early 2008 and 
the subsequent sharp fall at the end of 2008. This is corresponding to the views that crude oil 
prices became high in the early part of 2008 partly due to the speculative inflow of funds, and 
partly due to the tightening of supply and demand conditions (see Bank of Japan 2008a) and 
that the price of oil fell rapidly at the end of 2008 due to increased risk aversion among 
investors reflecting disruptions in global financial markets (see Bank of Japan 2008b). 
 
4.2. The effect of Oil Price Shocks on the Economic Activity and Price Development 
Figure 3-5 summarize the responses of the level of real GDP and CPI to each of the 
three structural shocks. Both real GDP and CPI respond very differently to each of the three 
structural shocks in all three countries. This clearly shows that Kilian’s findings, the way oil 
price  changes  affect  the  US  economy  is  very  different  depending  on  where  the  changes 
fundamentally come from, is also true for Japan and the UK. 
Oil supply disruptions cause a small decline in the US and Japan’s real GDP with some 
delays, whereas it leads to a small increase in the UK real GDP, but the one-standard error 
bands imply statistical insignificance. The corresponding effect on the level of the CPI is 
similar between the three economies. It is mostly flat and statistically insignificant for the 
first  6  quarters  and  then  becomes  negative  afterwards.  Regarding  an  aggregate  demand 
expansion, there is a similar pattern in the response of the US, the UK and Japan’s real GDP 7 
 
within first two years. After the second year, real GDP in the US and the UK become flat 
afterwards whereas Japan’s real GDP keeps its level above initial state. At the end of the third 
year, the response of the US and the UK turns to be negative, which is statistically significant. 
Meanwhile, this shock causes a statistically significant increase in the price level of the US 
and the UK. In contrast, interestingly, it causes neither a statistically significant increase nor a 
decrease in the price level of Japan. A positive oil-market specific demand shock leads to a 
slight decline in the US and the UK real GDP. On the other hand, in Japan, this shock leads to 
a sustained increase in real GDP that reaches its maximum at the 10th quarter. This increase 
is  statistically  significant  in  the  first  three  and  a  half  years  but  becomes  statistically 
insignificant after that. The corresponding effect on the level of the CPI is similar between 
the three economies. It results in a sustained and highly statistically significant increase. 
The  result  suggests  a  fair  degree  of  similarity  in  the  real  GDP  and  CPI  responses 
between the US and the UK. The biggest difference between those two economies and the 
Japanese economy is that oil-specific demand shocks have a positive impact on Japanese 
GDP, while it results in reduction in the US and the UK real GDP. This result seems to 
confirm the findings of recent studies, stating that the impact of oil price increases on Japan’s 
economy are relatively small or even positive and very different from other oil-importing 
countries. For example, Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo (2009) compared industry-level effects 
of oil price change in the US and Japan and found that the increase in the price of oil caused a 
global demand shift, especially in automobiles, towards more oil-efficent products made in 
Japan and thus it increases production in Japan. In this sense, the positive response of real 
GDP in Japan to the oil-specific demand shock can be explained in part by the result of a 
global demand shift towards oil efficient products made in Japan. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main results can be summarized as below: First, by extending the sample period 
from  Kilian  (2009),  I  have  found  that  oil-specific  demand  shocks  as  well  as  aggregate 
demand  shocks  played  an  important  role  in  the  wild  fluctuations  in  oil  prices  since  the 
mid-2000s.  Second,  I  investigated  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  price  of  oil  on  three 
industrialized economies. I have shown that the statement that the way oil price changes 
affect economy is very different depending on where the changes fundamentally come from 
is also true for Japan and the UK. The most interesting finding is that oil-specific demand 
shocks increase real GDP in Japan, which is very different from the US and the UK where 
oil-specific demand shocks lead to reduction in real GDP. This difference possibly comes 
from the oil efficiency of Japanese products. In this sense, a rise in the price of oil does not 
necessarily have a negative impact on Japan’s economy, which is in contrast to the public 
belief that an increase in oil price has negative consequences for the lives of Japanese people.    8 
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